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This policy brief is based on analysis
of reports, political speeches, legal
documents and interviews.
RESPOND is a Horizon 2020 project
which aims at studying the
multilevel governance of migration











































































































The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has ascended to power
in 2010 and entrenched his hold on Hungarian politics thanks to the 
financial, migration, and recently coronavirus crises that hit the
European Union and Hungary after 2008. Despite what appears to
be his anti-EU narrative all throughout, however, the EU has accom-
modated Hungary and has been increasingly reticent with – if any – 
sanctions. A technocratic leadership style aiming for public – rather 
than political – accountability has been Orbán’s major crisis manage-
ment technique. He carved his indispensability to any crisis manage-
ment by appealing to public insecurities. 
This policy brief reflects on the issues of “West” and “Europe” in Hun-
garian political narrative and public philosophy (Mehta 2011) drawing 
insights from Viktor Orbán’s speeches collected for RESPOND Work 
package 6 (WP6) “Conflicting Conceptualizations of Europeanization” 
report as well as interviews with civil society actors in the country in 
2018 and 2019 as part of the RESPOND project. Looking at the
Hungarian case, it presents assumptions about strong leadership 
and Europragmatism amidst economic, political, and health crises. 
Our policy recommendations are aimed for anti-authoritarian policy and ideational circles in Europe and 
Hungary. In order, we follow first the leadership pattern that Orbán adopted at the detriment of Hungary’s 
relations with the West and second how he manipulated particular crisis contexts via both formal institu-
tions and strategic discourses so that he could entice the public opinion with anti-western political narra-
tives. It is still noteworthy to note that Orbán’s anti-western political discourse endorsed Hungary as the 
main pillar of stability of Europe noting its economic, migration and recently public health policies. To this 
extent, his pragmatism should dispel any convictions that the Hungarian Prime Minister is anti-EU. Orbán 
believes in an alternative Europeanisation and that is based in Christian values that securitizes those out-
side the Judeo-Christian world. Hence, while we examine the structural and discursive tenets of Orbán’s 
crisis leadership, in this brief, we will also offer a novel interpretation of how Europragmatism and Euros-
cepticism can interact reflecting on RESPOND WP6 – Conflicting Conceptualizations of Europeanisation. 
Both at the face of the abrupt increase in the number of irregular migrant arrivals and the coronavirus 
crisis, Orbán pursued a self-made moral leadership to manage a “self-declared” crisis governance. The 
enfeebled institutional accountability, weakened judiciary and parliamentary oversight due to the earlier 
constitutional changes in Hungary after 2011 have also allowed Orbán to manipulate crises in a way to first  
inculcate certain social knowledge structures in public philosophy and second to exploit public insecurities 
that are boosted via the very mechanisms of crisis governance. We can therefore emphasize the following.
  • Orbán’s leadership and political success style has gained resonance both in Eastern and Western    
  Europe. There is now a need to understand what makes this leadership successful despite the support  
  for EU membership remaining high in Hungary.  
  • Given the tendency to turn to strong leaders among the public amidst crises, we need to recognize   
  how the political leaders use public susceptibilities to inculcate new paradigms alternative to existing   
  ones even if the latter remains popular. 
  • Euroscepticism has long been conceived by policy makers along the lines or at least a close term to   










































































































































































































































































































































































  • Euroscepticism has long been conceived by policy makers along the lines or at least a close term
  to Eurorejectionism or Europhobia. However, there is an element of a search for Europeanisation that
  is alternative to its liberal-oriented form in Euroscepticism, and this is not necessarily Europhobic or
  Eurorejectionist. The Hungarian case presents inferences regarding how alternative interpretations to
  liberal-oriented Europeanisation emerge. This is what we qualify as Europragramatism. 
  • The Hungarian case shows how enfeebled accountability is prone to reproduce pragmatism to serve   
  technocratic leadership embellished with populist undertones. It shows what happens when political    
  leaders shift accountability from institutional control to popular control, and manipulate the latter. 
The evidence for this policy report relies on Viktor Orbán’s political narrative analysis as well as interviews 
with civil society actors carried out in 2018 and 2019 for the RESPOND project. Therefore, we concentrate 
on how the theme of Europe was dealt with at macro level, that is in political discourses, amidst the
economic crisis after 2008 and the recent coronavirus crisis as well as the narrative on “migration crisis”
at the macro- and meso-levels by civil society actors. A presentation of Hungary acting more morally
than – what he calls – the liberal, elitist, cosmopolitan, and capitalist West/EU qualified Orbán’s discourse 
whereas reflections on a general discrepancy between the Hungarian and European mechanisms of
migration management were frequently stated in interviews with civil society organisations dealing with
migration issues. In his criticism of the EU, as we noted above, Orbán has not pursued a Eurorejectionist 
tone. He remained committed to EU as an idea, but he called how it was managed by the Brussels elite 
being against the demands and wishes of the general European publics. Below, we present our evidence 







  The economic crisis in 2008 that put Hungary’s national debt to GDP ratio at highest level in the devel   
  oped world, and the subsequent political quandary that Hungary found itself in presented the conditions  
  ripe for Orbán. Since winning the office in 2010, an all-reaching conservative discourse accompanied    
  Orbán’s vision for Hungary and Europe to disparage the wrongdoings of liberalization that led country to  
  crisis. Instead of liberalism that marked the making of national and European politics in Hungary, Fidesz   
  adopted new discursive tools indicating an alternative modernization, based on Christian values, strong   
  state, and nation. Thereby, Fidesz engaged in a moral revolution to re-acquire Hungary’s strength      
  vis-à-vis its liberal foes at the domestic front and international capital and bankers on the Western front   
  (Korkut 2012). In time, Orbán adopted the image of a leader that is a hard-working, engaged in a con-   
  stant fight with, first, non-Hungarian capital that puts the future of Hungarian families in danger;       
  second, energy companies, banks, and private pension funds that usurp the meagre earnings of Hun-   
  garian households; third, the European elites that criticize his work; and finally, the domestic opposi -    
  tion that attempt to control his party’s sway on the executive and judiciary powers.
  This image  aimed to show that a leader, who knows what his nation’s needs serves the nation the best   
  (Korkut 2012). 
  Ad hoc economic decisions at an unqualifiedly low level of economic legislation set the rules. These     
  new rules were careless about the economic aptitude of the country, global economic changes, the
  requirements of international and national economic collaboration, rule of law, harmonization of stability   
  and accountability, fiscal, monetary, and income policy, the interests of economic actors, the social
  impacts of economic decisions, and future outcomes (Békesi 2014). What eventually took hold was     
  populist policy making, and voluntarist economic steps, which support a patriotic economic policy that   
  appeals to the hearts of the Hungarian nation, to national interests and sovereignty, and the defence of   
  families and Hungarian people. In the end, according to Békesi (2014, 8) Fidesz system is a “mafia      
  state” where economic enterprise goes hand in hand with political enterprise. Voszka (2014) indicated    
  that Orbán neither accepted a neo-liberal nor a welfare state and he aspired to choose another route.    
  This suggests a neo-liberal/ultra-liberal turn in tax and social policy while remaining paternalist in the    
  issue of decreasing utility costs, i.e., energy, water charges for families. It aspires aggressively to spread   




















































































































































































































































  Economic science does not have a name for a system that continuously limits state financial support
  for healthcare, education, social welfare support, yet has ambitions of state-led-capitalism in a highly    
  confined economy. In this system the party formulates the state structures on the basis of its own
  reflection and partially also becomes dissolved into it (Debreczeni 2013). Laws are followed only when    
  they are in harmony with the interests of political power while trust remains vested in persons not in
  institutions. This context hence avails the leader to transmit new identities and collective rationality as    
  solutions to the crisis – especially to conceal its failure to improve the welfare of the majority (Scharle    
  2014). Voszka (2014) notes Fidesz’s propaganda machine, to this effect, through state controlled public   
  media and affiliated private media outlets. To alleviate the impact of neo-liberal turn in tax and social     
  policy on welfare, these outlets put in circulation “alibi” concepts such as “Hungary will become the     
  center of industrial, agricultural, and building production/output”; “we have consolidated Hungarian     
  economy on many pillars and decreased its dependence and defenselessness”; “vindication of protec   
  tionism in order to cultivate/generate “national capital” and enterprises; and strengthening of middle     















  Ad hoc decisions and endorsing alibi concepts became a legacy for crisis management for Orbán      
  amidst the sudden increase in the number of irregular migrant arrivals to Europe in 2015 as well. The    
  Hungarian government then declared a “state of crisis due to mass migration” giving unfettered powers  
  to the army and the police to quash any unrest (Gyollai, 2018). This self-defined extraordinary situation   
  enhanced the government’s sway later over the third sector organisations active in migrant integration    
  field and controlled everyday narrative sometimes by circulating its own fake news.1 The migration      
  crisis also provided Orbán with substance to define Europeanization anew. For him, Europe was the     
  space  where a conservative, Christian interpretation should rule rather than the liberal and cosmopolitan  
  Europe that the “Brussels elite”, aka the EU Commission according to Orbán, steers. With respect to    
  migration management, Orbán asked for respect from the EU. “We have guarded Europe's borders for a  
  thousand years and fought for our national independence. We are a brave and warrior nation that knows  
  well who is not respected, despised. We are not understood in Brussels today”.2 Orbán still claimed a    
  moral authority with a warning that a new népvándorlás or “the Great wandering of the peoples” put a   
  question mark for all that was taken for granted in Europe.” Ostensibly defending the peoples of Europe,  
  Orbán stated that “we do not want to become a nation of migrants. We do not want to see what the
  migrant communities of Western Europe bring: terror, public insecurities, the feeling of safety and
  comfort of being at home that the autochthonous nations feel at the face of migration”.3 To this extent,   
  Orbán took one of the membership obligations of Hungary – applying the refugee settlement quota –    
  to referendum in 2016. Orbán took this opportunity to criticize the EU and its bureaucrats for not being   
  able to defend Europe and highlighted the righteousness of Hungary and the role that it played in the    
  “defense” of Europe. 



















































































































































  In a way, standing against Brussels and common migration management became a signifier of being a   
  true European for Orbán.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 To dispel the criticisms on the treatment of asylum-seekers in Hungary and particularly their inhuman






































































































 Orbán’s position is that Hungary sets the future course of Europeanization rather than the EU Commission  
 and its liberal members. Hence, reflecting on the discrepancy between refugee reception in Hungary and   
 the EU rules and regulations to this extent, Orbán stated that “Europe would have done better has it not   
 rejected Hungarian solutions, which prove themselves to be operational and useful, and many other coun- 
 tries have adopted them from [Hungary] already”.7
The discussion above shows how amidst the migration  
 crisis, Orbán attempted to assume a moral leadership not only for the Hungarian public but with European  
 publics in mind as well. He succeeded in his quest, and managed to inculcate an alternative style of
 Europeanization while maintaining a positive image of EU in Hungary at 52% with a 9% increase from
 earlier years.8
In this regard, our interviewees from the civil sector reflected on how Hungary managed to   
 pursue a “hardcore” migration policy in the EU but veered away from the EU, and presented Europe as
 dysfunctional with over-burdened structures whereby many that failed in their asylum applications cannot  
 be returned. In a nutshell, Hungary opposes this system of refugee reception and states that what the     
 Hungarians wished to see happening for the rest of Europe, that is, a highly-controlled reception system,   
 has already happened in Hungary.9
In this attempt, Hungary endeavored to tell both to the rest of Europe   
 and its public that the Hungarian system is not all that different from the practices in other EU countries.
 In a way, raising attention to particular events in Italy or France and a form of whataboutism justified
 de-humanizing practices against asylum-seekers in Hungary.10 Furthermore, as a result of the differences   
 between member-state and EU priorities and their overall disparity, the projects and services set at the
 EU level do not extend to member-states.11 This made one of our interviewees to indicate that there is no   
 EU-level of migration management at all and what goes on in Hungary contravenes all international
 migration treaties. In this muddled migration governance, Orbán consolidates his own migration and
 conservative Europeanisation narrative as an alternative to the liberal course of Europeanization that held   









 The Covid-19 pandemic provided Viktor Orbán with yet another opportunity to regulate the everyday
 narrative around crisis situation. Perhaps not accidentally, the PM inferred a causal link between the
 pandemic and migration in his regular weekly Friday radio interview on national channel Kossuth Rádió
 in March 2020: 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Prior to that, the government shut down the transit zones that operate both as de facto and de jure
 reception centres at the Hungarian-Serbian border, claiming that most of the asylum seekers arriving to    
 Hungary transit through Iran – one of the epicentres of the virus. This discursive cross-referencing
 between migration issues and the pandemic has been instrumental to the government’s purpose to
 legitimise its own crisis management role to the public. Even what may appear as irrational moves such
 as donating hundreds of thousands of face masks to Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and North Macedonia in    
 April – despite nationwide GPs’ having requested the necessary personal protective equipment (PPE),    
 were justified with obfuscated coronavirus migration connection. Péter Szijjártó, the Minister of Foreign
 Affairs, rubber-stamped the decision as necessary and indicated that this was necessary to support
 Hungary’s southern neighbours in their fight with irregular migration. Szijjártó argued that if these
 countries were incapacitated by the virus, they would not be able to overcome a potential future
 migratory pressure.14
 Furthermore, the Orbán government also received a rule by decree power from the Hungarian Parliament   
 effectively indefinitely in mid-March 202015 in order to enhance salience in crisis management but
 essentially to assist Orbán consolidate his role central to crisis management. In order to guarantee
 continuity of control in the Parliament, Fidesz also introduced a clause that whilst the crisis situation
 continues there could be no by-election or referendum.  This was an attempt to hinder the Hungarian
 opposition from any attempts to tarnish the parliamentary control of the Fidesz government and won     
 against the government thanks to building electoral alliances.  However, despite having assumed an
 unprecedented and exclusive power to handle the crisis thanks to rule-by-decree, the government
 dodged responsibility for care home deaths as an example in Budapest. Orbán exploited the situation
 for electoral purposes, and blamed the opposition mayor of the capital Gergely Karácsony for deaths.  





































































































































































































































































































 After two months of emergency rule, Orbán signalled that he was ready to relinquish his extraordinary     
 powers at the end of May 2020 while his government was looking to shift from “crisis governance” to
 play “a modest role in pandemic preparedness” according to the government spokesperson Gergely     
 Gulyás.  There are some, who may consider this a sign of well-functioning democracy in Hungary.
 However, if we approach his crisis governance amidst the pandemic and particularly his discursive style,   
 we can grasp the legacy of the rule by decree will leave in Hungary. 
 At the time of writing the government revealed the questions of the forthcoming “national consultation”    
 about public opinions on its crisis management. Similar to other crises, national consultation is Orbán’s    
 strategy to keep crisis mood alight in order to justify continuity in his technocratic leadership style.
 National consultation has been a governmental tool of manipulation, which predominantly consists of     
 leading questions prompting answers favoured by the Fidesz-KDNP government (Gyollai, 2018; Gyollai    
 and Korkut, 2019). Although framed around the coronavirus crisis, the current consultation merges the    
 measures introduced during the pandemic with the earlier anti-immigrant, Europhobic and anti-Soros
 discourse of Orbán, thus attempts to gain legitimation of the government’s extraordinary crisis





























































































































































































































































































































































 Further anti-EU political message was embellished into crisis management since Orbán stated that the    
 coronavirus crisis has exposed the EU’s “weaknesses” and failure to help in times of need.22 Orbán justi-  
 fied his anti-westernism with a trope that “help does not really come from here”. Alleging the EU’s institu-  
 tional structures having deficiencies in responding to the crisis, he continued “there are times when you    
 can’t be polite” and he “made it clear to EU “squeakers” that now is not the time to “reason” with legal,    
 theoretical issues because there is an epidemic, lives need to be saved”. He continued to say that “the    
 high-salaried  EU epidemiology office staff” i.e., the European Centre for Disease Prevention, failed in
 January and February months to prevent the pandemic in Europe.23 
 Instead, he chose to endorse the Chinese credentials of the fight against the coronavirus. He and the
 Chinese Ambassador to Budapest met a Chinese plane with medical supplies at the Budapest Airport
 earlier in the crisis while the Hungarian media provided the images of Orbán and the Ambassador of
 China meeting each other with elbow greetings to emphasise the conviviality between the two regimes.24 
 While Orbán’s move to rule by decree has been condemned by several international actors including EU   
 officials and institutions, Orbán commented on their criticisms as the “most hideous and hypocritical”     
 attack amidst his efforts to save Hungarian lives.25  As he later phrased it in a radio interview:   
 
































































































































































































 Thereby, similar to economic crisis and the period after the sudden increase in the number of irregular
 migrant arrivals to Europe, Orbán once again has placed alibi concepts at the heart of his crisis
 management strategy and attack against the Brussels elite. 
To conclude the Hungarian case shows how amidst crises, rather than ensuring the accountability of their 
decisions, governments can seek full executive control amidst a crisis narrative that alleges external alibis 
and foes with economic, humanitarian, and health challenges and failures. Political leaders can stimulate
the processes by which their followers’ understanding of the world is produced (van Leuuwen 2007, 95) 
during crises. Leaders have a stake in social knowledge production, legitimation, and inculcation of such 
knowledge among their followers (van Leuuwen 2007; Reyes 2011) to foster collective rationalities. Since 
being elected to power in 2010, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has remained an effective force 
of social knowledge creation regarding an alternative economic system to face the aftermath of the financial 
crisis (c.f. Korkut 2012), a protectionist and security-oriented migration regime (Gyollai 2019 and Gyollai and 
Korkut 2019 and 2020), and finally a technocratic leadership orientation to face the coronavirus crisis (Korkut  
forthcoming). What is crucial for our purposes is to understand how he could maintain a convergent
anti-elitist, anti-liberal, and anti-western tone in all throughout, while inculcating that Hungary is the pillar of 
stability and the future of Europe. This necessitates an understanding of how public philosophies operate. 
Public philosophies entrusting crisis management to authoritative executive action can become a kind of 
meta-problem resolution mechanism for the public. When a new issue arises, these meta-ideas provide a 
heuristic that tells political actors what aspects to emphasize and what side to take. These meta-ideas may 
also provide a way for political actors to gain legitimacy on specific topics that for the audience might be un-



















































































































































































































































 set the parameters of a shared vision between the public and the leader while himself as the sole change   
 agency to face upcoming challenges.
 Public philosophies matter particularly when many citizens uphold simplistic and pragmatic opinions
 about complex matters such as economy, migration, and pandemic. In the cacophony of simplistic
 opinions, expert opinions on complex matters can go amiss and political leaders as entrepreneurs may    
 appeal to hearts much easier. At the same time, while accountability remains absent or hindered, political   
 leaders can pragmatically juggle foes and enemies (migrants, international forces, the EU elite, domestic   
 opposition to name a few) as it fits with their crisis-management techniques. While one can say that it is   
 lack of media freedom that presents the opportunity to political entrepreneurs to manipulate, it is also
 noteworthy that neither during the migration nor the coronavirus crisis, the Hungarian opposition mana
 ged to present alternatives to manipulative discourses of the government. This policy brief shows the
 importance of producing alternative paradigms in order to contravene authoritarian narratives rather than   
 cynicism that has determined the political course of action that liberal politicians and citizens have
 pursued for too long. 
 We also showed that rejecting the liberal course of Europeanisation is not necessarily Euroscepticism or   
 Eurorejectionism, but can operate as a quest for an alternative Europeanization – one that pragmatically   
 serves conservative politics. In this way, Orbán can even emerge as a true pro-EU figure. Considering this  
 case, the European Parliament and European Commission have a duty to consolidate the public narrative  
 that endorsing democracy, equality, and human rights is not a characteristic of what their foes allege as a   
 liberal agenda. These are at the fundamentals of the European project. The EU will otherwise be running   
 the danger of adopting an image that it takes sides in highly politicized debates affecting European futures  
 and fundamental rights as its foes diminish the democratic element as barely liberal and self-serving for a   
 distant elite. What the Hungarian case continuously shows is how their narrative operates as a pragmatic   
 branding tool to endorse a crisis-managing government with the sole aim to deliver consistently while     
 fighting against its domestic and external liberal foes. Considering our analysis above, we have the
 following policy recommendations. 
 It is with urgency that European Union should concentrate on following its member states’ political
 accountability structures as it does with financial accountability for structural funds. The EU should
 develop measures for political accountability in its member states in order to safeguard the standards for   
 democratic governance is met and maintained. Political accountability is the main pillar of democratic
 governance. There is a relationship between enfeebled accountability, manipulation of public opinion, and  
 EU member states’ political, economic, humanitarian tendencies contravening Europeanisation. Therefore,  
 similar to vigilance with financial accountability, the European Commission needs to make sure that
 political accountability is in order in its member states. 
 An issue that commonly appeared in Hungarian narratives is using alibi concepts and alleging external    
 foes with responsibility for crises. It is unacceptable that the PM of a member state can target the EU     
 Commission calling it continuously “the Brussels elite”. It is even more puzzling that the EU Commission   
 does not come out straightforward against these allegations and support civil society in a public
 campaign in Hungary to present to the Hungarian public where the EU stands on democratic governance  
 clearly. The EC should commission a task force or start a public inquiry to find innovative ways for
 engaging with European publics with the aim of encountering the nativist populist challenge and promote   
 democratic governance in member states. In the absence of such frank engagement with European
 publics, it is no wonder that the national politicians with populist tendencies continue to allege the EU
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